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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
17341

MICHAEL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from appellant's conviction

of

forgery in the District Court, Third Judicial District,
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant Michael Jones, was convicted by a jury
of forgery, a second degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 76-2-202 and Section 76-6-501 (1953
as amended).

The appellant was sentenced to the Utah State

Prison for a term of from one to fifteen years.

(R. 89).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction and
denial of the request for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

February 4, 1980, Helen Stokes, the appel-

lant's girlfriend, tried to cash a check for $2,250 at
Walker Bank (T. 9-11).

Appellant waited outside while

was in the bank ( T. 12, 13) .

When the check was present:

to the bank manager for approval, he recognized that the
check was forged and immediately called the owner of the
check, Mr. Fuoco (T. 10, 11).
Mr. Fuoco indicated that the check had
from his car on February 1, 1980 (T. 37-40).

~ens~

His car wa:I
'

parked at a garage where appellant worked (T. 44), and i

I

appellant had serviced Mr. Fuoco's car that day (T. 45),
He had not signed the check and had not authorized anyor.:
else to sign it (T. 37).

When he was called by thebanK,

he verified that the check was stolen and he called the
police (T. 40).
The pol ice arrived and arrested Helen Stokes ar.:
appellant (T. 66, 67).

Appellant had fled when the poli:

arrived but was apprehended soon thereafter (T. 19).

I
!I'

Appellant was searched and police found money and anotre:I
·
·
forged check in
his
wa 11 et ( T. 71) .

He gave conflictina ,

answers to the police at that time (T. 74).

As appeJlan:

i

he saic

i

and his girlfriend Helen Stokes were ta k en away,
her, "I love you anyway,

even if you screwed it up."('.·

59).
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1

Helen Stokes was a minor at the time and was
referred to Juvenile court (T. 102).

As a minor she knew

she could not be prosecuted for forgery with the appellant
(T. 108).

Appellant was charged as an accomplice to

forgery (R. 12).

At trial, Helen Stokes claimed that she

had stolen the checks, forged them, put one in appellant's
wallet and attempted to cash one forged check at the bank
(while appellant waited outside) all without appellant's
knowledge (T.

91, 93, 94).

The State produced evidence

showing that appellant was the one most likely to have
stolen the checks (T. 46, 48).

He had over a thousand

dollars in cash which had come from other checks forged
earlier (T. 102), as well as an additional forged check (T.
71).

At the bank, he had denied knowing Helen Stokes (T.

74), but they had gone to the bank together (T. 12, 13,
94).

While she claimed responsibility for all aspects
of the crime, Helen Stokes did not know the color of the
car the checks were taken from or the location of the
checks inside the car (T. 100, 101), and she admitted to
lying to the bank official and the police (T. 103, 104).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty (R. 85).
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison

(R. 89,

90).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF FORGERY
Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict.

Respondent disagr<:

asserting that the evidence produced by the State in thi:
case was legally sufficient to support the verdict of th:
jury.
It is well established

in Utah that in order::·

a convicted defendant to succeed on appeal in challeng:i:
the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must
establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or

insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertaineGi
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.

I

State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880 (1978); State v.

Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977); State v. Jones, Utah,_')

P.2d 1321 (1976); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, .. ,

iI

( 1976).
In State v. Larrun, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980),
Court said:
It is the exclusive function of the
jury to weigh the evidence and to

-4-
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determine the credibility of the
witnesses, and it is not within the
prerogative of this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the fact-finder.
This Court should only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that reasonable men could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
606 P.2d at 231.

That case cited numerous other cases as

standing for the same proposition.
State v. Reddish, Utah, 550

606 P.2d at 231, N. 2.

P.2d 778 (1976) held that

where the defendant's version of the story differs from the
State's, the court must assume that the jury believed that
version which supports their verdict.
In reviewing this case, this Court must survey and
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, State v. Helm, Utah, 563 P.2d 794, 796
(1977); State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465
(1964), and disregard any errors which do not substantially
preJudice the rights of the appellant, State v. Sinclair,
supra; Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§

§

77-42-1 (1953 as amended).

Under

77-42-1, a presumption exists to the

effect that any error found is presumed not to have
resulted in prejudice.
Appellant asserts that there was no substantial
evidence that defendant participated in or had any
knowledge of the forgery (Appellant's Brief at 5).

-5-
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Appellant was charged with and convicted of forgery in
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-2-202 and
Section 76-6-501 (1953 as amended).

They read as follo•:'

76-2-202. Every person, acting with the
mental state required for the commission
of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
76-6-501.
(1) A person is guilty of
forgery if, with purpose to defraud
anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by
anyone, he:
(a)
Alters any writing of another
without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b)
Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that
the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or uterance
purports to be the act of another,
whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been
executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original
when no such original existed.
( 2)
As used in this section "writing"
includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens,
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols
of value, right, privilege, or
identification.
( 3)
Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to
be:

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(a)
A security, revenue stamp, or
any other instrument or writing issued by
a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, bonds,
or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim
against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or
enterprise.
(4)
Forgery is a felony of the third
degree if the writing is or purports to
be a check with a face amount of less
than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
The State's burden consisted of introducing evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the check had
been forged,

there was an intent to defraud, the check was

in an amount over $100.00, and the appellant solicited,
requested, co!lllnanded, encouraged or aided Helen Stokes in
forging the check and presenting it for cash at the bank.

As an accomplice, he was then also criminally liable for
the forgery which was committed by Helen Stokes (R. 39).
There was sufficient evidence to satisfy such a
burden.

The State did prove that the check in question had

been forged.

The check was not signed by its owner Mr.

Fuoco, nor did he authorize anyone else to sign it (T. 37).
Helen Stokes admitted to the making and presentment of the
forged check with an intent to defraud Walker Bank (T. 95,
103),

The check was made

out for over $100.00 (T. 9).
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I

The only issue then is whether Helen Stokes act,
alone as alleged by the defense or was aided by appe 1k,:I'
as the jury found.

Appellant had access to the car tha:

the checks were stolen from (T. 45, 47).

He serviced tt,;'

car in the morning then took it to a seventh floor park
area ( T.

46).

at work (T. 48).

Later in the day Helen Stokes visited hi:
She testified that she took the checks

i

from the car (T. 92), but another witness testified that'
the car would already have been taken to an upper floor:
46).

Helen Stokes testified that she did not know what

color the car was, did not recall the color of the inter:
and took the checks out of a pouch in the car door (T. ii
101).

The car was brown, not green or blue as guessed

Helen Stokes (T.

100, 109, 110).

The checks were int::

glove compartment of the car as the car does not
side pouch ( T. 11 O) •

bi

han~

Th is is certainly not so "lacking'
i

insubstantial" as to preclude the jury from finding tha:

j

the appellant, rather than Helen Stokes, took the checks I

I
from the car.
Evidence as to what took place at the bank is a::
in dispute, but there is sufficient basis to find appeL:
guilty of encouraging Helen Stokes to forge the check. ' .
1

testified that appellant waited while she went into the

-8-
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•

bank (T. 94).

Appellant told the police that he had not

gone to the bank with her and did not know what she was
doing (T. 74, 75).
time.

He was, however, waiting outside at the

Other discrepancies also appeared in the testimony.

Helen Stokes said that she put a check in his wallet but
did not tell the defendant about the check (T. 99).

When

he was arrested, the defendant first denied any knowledge
of the check, then indicated that Helen Stokes had given it
to him (T. 74).

When questioned about the cash he had, the

defendant first responded that his mother had given it to
him (T. 74).

Helen Stokes also admitted that she lied to

the bank manager (T. 103) and lied to the police on several
occasions (T. 104, 105).
The defendant also acted very suspiciously.

He

left the bank as soon as he saw the police (T. 19), gave
varying stories to the police and denied any knowledge of
Helen Stokes.

As they were led away into custody, the

appellant said to Helen Stokes, "I love you anyway even if
you screwed it up." (T. 59).
The defense consisted of the testimony of Helen
Stokes, who had a motive for taking the blame.

She was a

minor and had already been dealt with by Juvenile Court.
She could not be prosecuted for the forgery (T. 108).

By

testifying that she was to blame, the defendant would be
absolved from any liability and they would both go free.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Considering the evidence, respondent submits
that the jury had sufficient evidence on which to base a
verdict of guilt.

The jury could reasonably have found

that appellant did take the checks, that he knew they wer:
forged and that he encouraged Helen Stokes to forge and
present the checks.

He fled when the police arrived and

gave conflicting responses to their questions.
Since the credibility of the witnesses became
crucial and the testimony was conflicting, it was left tc

the jury to determine which of the conflicting testirnonie:
it would believe.

State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66

State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216

m:

(1976).

The evidence was not so inconclusive and
doo~

insubstantial that there must have been reasonable
as to whether the defendant committed the crime.

~,

Daniels, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; State v.

Jones,~

State v. Lamm, supra; State v. Menzies, Utah, 601 P.2d~i
(1979); and State v.

Logan, Utah 563 P. 2d 811 (1977). 'i:

the evidence presented, in the light most favorable tot:
state, the record clearly contains substantial evidence;
which the jury could reasonably determine beyond a reaso:
doubt that appellant did solicit, encourage and aid Hele:
Stokes in the commission of a forgery.
In addition, this issue was not properly raise:
before the trial court in a motion for a new trial.

~·

·
before thi' s Court on appeaJ,
it is not a proper ques t ion

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial court should have been given a chance to rule on this
issue.

See State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977);

Johnson v. Simons, Utah, 551 P.2d 515 (1976).
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS WERE NOT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR INASMUCH AS THE STATEMENTS
WERE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER TRIAL TACTICS.
Appellant alleges that statements by Ms.
Strachan, prosecutor, establishing the credibility of
Officer Yontz, were prejudicial because they amounted to an
improper bolstering of that witness' testimony.

Respondent

submits that the comments made by the prosecutor
constituted

a proper exercise of counsel's right to sum up

her case.
The prosecutor has the right and the duty to
analyze the evidence as a whole and to include any
statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn from such
evidence.

State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949, 951 (1975);

State v. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1977).
Furthermore, the trial court judge is allowed considerable
latitude of judgment as to what is permissible for counsel
to argue.

Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 412

( 1961).
In State v. Bautista,

J
530

30

Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d

( 197 3), the defendant in a rape case claimed that the

Prose cu tor,

misconduct.
in closing argument, was guilty of

This Court, however, held that there was no misconduct
since the prosecutor,

in summing up his case, has "wide

discretion and is entitled to exercise considerable freedom
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
in expressing
toLibrary
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jury his view of the evidence." Id. at 533.
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..,
Counsel's reference to the credibility of Offii
Yontz was not improper.

Defense testimony was conflict:·

and resolution of the trial required a determination oi
which version to believe.

Helen Stokes, the proponent

the other version, admitted to lying to bank officers

at

police officers as well as having difficulty recalling
certain aspects of the case.

Thus, it was not improper:

the prosecutor to explain why the police officer's vers::!
was credible.

The record fails to show that the jury kr.''

of the prosecutor's law school connection that is
complained of.

Consequently, the jury could not have dr;,

the inferences suggested by the appellant.
Appellant has not shown why it was improper to;
argue the credibility of Officer Yontz.

There is

M

indication as to why appellant claims prejudice resultir:
from the prosecutor's comment itself.

If the statement

that law students are more perceptive and alert was sud:I
I

improper suggestion, then the burden is on the defense
counsel to correct that error on cross examination.

trl' i

·I

.
t
Defense counsel should have taken the opportunity a

to attack the credibility that was "improperly

bolstere::

In her closing arguments, defense counsel did attack the
credibility of the officer by reminding the jury that
rely on Yontz' memory, a memory alone."

(T. 132).
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T~

prosecution then later tried to rehabilitate the
credibility of the police officer ( T. 141).

If the

statements were improper and appellant failed to correct
that error on cross examination, then the error is the
fault of appellant and not the trial court.
In addition,

appellant failed to object at trial

to the alleged improper statements.

It is probable that

appellant failed to object at trial because she knew the
statements were part of proper trial tactics.

Conse-

quently, appellant may not complain on appeal that statements were improperly made at trial.

The failure to object

to the prosecutor's remarks, which would have allowed the
trial court to rule on the alleged errors, resulted in a
waiver of the right to have the issue reviewed on appeal.
State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d

1398, 1400

(1971); State v. Dillon, 104 Ariz 33, 448 P.2d 89, 91
(1968).
In State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 532 (1978),
counsel made objections to some of the remarks made by the
prosecutor in summation, but failed to object to all
remarks listed as grounds for mistrial.

This Court held:

If counsel desires to object and
preserve his record as to such an error
during argument, he must call it to the
attention of the trial court so that if
he thinks that it is necessary and
appropriate to do so, he will have an
opportunity to rectify any error or
impropriety therein and thus ~bviate the
necessity of an entire new trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is important to note that it is the
responsibility of the trial court to determine if alle\'
improper arguments were prejudicial or harmless.

This

Court has reiterated continuously that i t will give grE,
deference to the judgment of the trial court.

In~

Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), the
prosecutor asked a question which was clearly objectionable.

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.

court ruled that the prosecutor's conduct was

The::.

not~

prejudicial as to violate the defendant's right to a fa;:
trial, and denied the motion.

The defendant appealed.

After noting that the action of the prosecutor was cer·
ta inly not to be commended, the Utah Supreme Court foun:
that the real issue on appeal was whether to sustain th:
judgment of the trial court.

Before affirming the

conviction the Court said:
Due to his advantaged position and
consistent with his responsibilities as
the authority in charge of the trial, the
inquiry is necessarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. · •
Inasmuch as this is his primary responsibility, when he has given due
consideration and ruled upon the matter,
this court on review should not upset his
ruling unless it clearly appears that he
has abused his discretion.
30 Utah 2d at 369-70.
Further, appellant has pointed to no harm that
resulted from this allegedly improper statement.
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such a showing, appellant has failed to suffer harm and the
statement, if it was error at all, was harmless.

See Rule

4 1 Utah Rules of Evidence.
Finally, the test found in

State v. Valdez, 30

Utah 2d 54, 60 513 P.2d 422 (1973), cited by appellant,
not met in this case.

is

First, the statement did not "call

to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not
be justified in considering."

The statement was made to

emphasize the credibility of the officer.

Certainly the

jury is entitled to hear information concerning the
credibility of the witnesses.

In fact, the jury members

were told that they were "the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence."

(R. 46).

Thus, the jury was justified in

considering the remark.
Second, there is no showing that if the statement
had been improper, the jury was influenced by the remark.
While the jury may have been influenced by the officer's
testimony, Valdez requires that the jury be influenced by
the prosecutor's statement, not that of the witness.
Appellant has not alleged that the jury was influenced by
the prosecutor's remarks.

(See Appellant's Brief at P· 8).

Respondent submits that the statements complained
of were within the realm of proper trial tactics.
~ppellant

failed, at trial, to object to the statements, to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attack the witness' credibility, or to request a new tr:
Thus, appellant may not complain on appeal.

The trial

court properly exercised its discretion and did not rul;
that there was any prejudice.

Appellant has not shown,

prejudice and therefore this court should find that the
statements were not error or that if they were, they wer:
harmless.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE A REQUESTED ALTERNATIVE
HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred ir
giving a jury instruction that did not include an
alternative hypo th es is.

Respondent answers that such ar.

alternative hypothesis instruction was not required int:.
case.
Appellant has not shown why this instruction
required.

Wi'i

I

There has been no authority cited which suppc:1

the contention that the ommission of the alternative

!

hypothesis was improper.
The standard in Utah as to the giving of such::
instruction was stated in State v. Fort, Utah, 572 p,ld
1387
57

(1977); and State v.

Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 p,::

(1960):

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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[W]here the only proof of material fact
or one which is a necessary element of
defendant's guilt consists of
circumstantial evidence, such circumstances must reasonably preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's
innocence . . .
[T]his rule is applicable only where the
proof of a material issue is based solely
on circumstantial evidence . • •
355 P.2d at 59, 60

(emphasis added).

The principle was

cited and reaffirmed in State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255,
470 P.2d 246,
216 (1976);

247

(1970); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d

State v. Dumas, Utah, 554 P. 2d 1313 (1976);

and State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978).
In the present case, that standard was met by the
trial court.

The evidence was not solely circumstantial

and thus did not require giving such an instruction to the
jury.

Evidence consisted of direct as well as circum-

stantial evidence.

The physical evidence introduced at

trial, the testimony of witnesses as to the appellant's
actions, and the lack of credibility of the alternative
hypothesis propounded by Helen Stokes all constituted
direct evidence and precluded requiring an alternative
hypothesis instruction to the jury.

Where the evidence is

both direct and circumstantial, the trial judge may
properly leave the determination to the jury on the basis
of reasonable doubt. State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216
(1976); State v.
(1970);

Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246

State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486

( 1961).

An instruction on reasonable doubt provides an
understandable criterion for decision making; an
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instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis
unnecessary and may confuse the jury.

~

In the instant c:i

the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt. ,,:
Instruction No. 20 (R.

54).

The trial judge

determine~
i

that the presence of direct evidence was sufficient ca~:1

to exclude a reasonable alternative hypothesis instructi:i
Such a determination was within his discretion and was
properly exercised.
The trial judge, exercising his discretioo,
refused to give the alternative hypothesis instruction
i
explaining that it was "given in substance." (R. 65) s:·]
this is an area for the exercise of judicial discretion,]
i

appellant must show an abuse of discretion, i.e., that t:I
judge was required to give such an instruction.

'

Appell''

I

has not alleged, nor shown, an abuse of discretion.

!

Appellant has not only failed to show that his!

::I

requested instruction is required, but has also failed

show that if it were to be required in this case, it wocl
have made some difference in the verdict.
CONCLUSION
,.1

The

evidence was not inconclusive or improba.-'I
The prose·

I

cu tor's closing arguments were not prejudicial error as

I

but was sufficient to support the verdict.

they were part of proper trial tactics designed to
establish the credibility of witnesses.

The al ternafr::
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I

hypothesis instruction was properly denied by the trial
judge as it was not required in this case.

For these

reasons, the request for a new trial should be denied and
appellant's conviction affirmed.
DATED this

JB~day

of August, 1981.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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